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Author's abstract 
Codes of medical ethics issued by professional 
organizalZons typically contain statements affirming the 
importance of confidentiality between patients and 
health-care practitioners. Seldom, however, is the 
conjidentiali(v obligation depicted as absolute. Instead, 
exceptions are noted, the most common of which is that 
health-care professionals are Justified in breaching the 
confidence of a patient if required by law to do so. 
Reasons that might be given to support this exception 
are critically discussed in this paper. The conclusion 
argued for is that this is not a legitimate exception to the 
confidentiality rule. 
On June 26, 1990, the American l'V1edical 
Association (AMA) House of Delegates adopted a 
report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
concerning the Fundamental Elements of the Patient-
Physician Relationship. 
Item four of the 'Fundamental Elements' deals 
with confidentiality and says: 'The patient has the 
right to confidentiality. The physician should not 
reveal confidential communications or information 
without the consent of the patient, unless provided 
for by law or by the need to protect the welfare of the 
individual or the public interest' (1). According to 
this statement, then, one of the three types of cases 
in which physicians are justified in breaching patient 
confidentiality is when they are required by law to do 
so. 
Such a claim echoes earlier pronouncements by 
the AMA. For example, in the AMA Principles of 
Medical Ethics (1957, 1971) it is stated: 'A physician 
may not reveal confidences entrusted to him in the 
course of medical attendance ... unless he is 
required to do so by law or unless it becomes 
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the 
individual or of the society' (2). In the 1980 revision 
of these principles, the confidentiality statement was 
altered. But it still said that physicians 'shall 
safeguard patient confidences within the constraints 
of the law' (3). 
--------------- ---
Keywords 
Cuofidentialit\·; codes uf ethics; law. 
The AlvlA is not alone in allowing this as an 
exception to the confidentiality rule. The British 
Medical Association's principles (1959, 1971), for 
example, say: 'It is a practitioner's obligation to 
observe the rule of professional secrecy by refraining 
from disclosing voluntarily without the consent of 
the patient (save with statutory sanction) to any third 
party information which he has learnt in his 
professional relationship with the patient' (4). 
And in 1992, the General Medical Council of 
Great Britain issued its Professional Conduct and 
Discipline: Fitness to Practise. Sections 76-91 deal 
with confidentiality, and item 85 says: 'Information 
may be disclosed in order to satisfy a specific 
statutory requirement ... ' 
Pertinent examples here include a legal require-
ment to report gunshot wounds, infectious diseases, 
and prima facie evidence of child abuse. Though 
these statutes may be reasonable and though such a 
consensus regarding this exception is impressive, I 
shall argue that health care practitioners are not justi-
fied in breaching patient confidence simply because 
they are required by law to do so. 
,""ly argument begins with a rather mundane 
observation. Laws are made by legislators, and they 
can and sometimes do enact legislation that is 
morally unjustified. Consider an extreme hypothetieal 
example. Suppose that a law were passed requiring 
physicians to report to a federal agency any patient 
testing positive for the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV). The purpose of the legislation is to 
develop a registry of persons with HIV and to make 
it available to insurance companies and prospective 
employers. I hope that anyone reading this will agree 
that putting this information to such use is morally 
unacceptable. And if the law is unjustified, it seems 
that physicians should refuse to comply with it. In 
the face of this point, why might anyone think that 
physicians are warranted in breaching patient 
confidence simply because they are required by law 
to do so? At least two reasons can be cited. 
Some point to the serious effects on society of 
disobeying the law as a reason in support of the 
AMA's exception to the confidentiality rule. Robert 
M Veatch articulates this reasoning eloquently. He 
writes: 
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'The physician, after all, is a citizen of the land and 
subject to the laws of the land. To decide to break 
the law, even when it appears justified by a 
professional code of ethics with a principle as well 
established as that of confidentiality, is no trivial 
decision; it is civil disobedience. 
, . .. But to reject legal authority routinely and 
without due thought is anarchistic. No society could 
survive the indiscriminate personal acceptance or 
rejection of law. If the physician is to avoid 
considering himself different from other citizens, he 
must treat civil disobedience with appropriate 
seriousness' (5). 
The argument, then, is that to break the law is to 
engage in an act of civil disobedience. But no society 
can survive if its citizens disobey the law 
indiscriminately. 
An argument based on exaggeration 
This is a familiar contention and is often advanced in 
contexts much broader than the one of concern here. 
The argument is unconvincing, however; it is based 
on an exaggeration. Isolated acts of civil 
disobedience by physicians will not constitute reject-
ing legal authority 'routinely' and will not destroy 
society's fabric; if societies were that delicate, most 
would long ago have ceased to exist. After all, 
illegal acts occur frequently. Moreover, those who 
deny that physicians are warranted in breaching 
confidence merely because the law requires that 
they do so are hardly advocating indiscriminate 
disobedience. The occasions for questioning the law 
will presumably be rare. 
There is an additional problem with the 
argument. Even if it were not based on an exag-
geration, it would not show that physicians are 
justified in breaching confidence when the law 
requires them to do so. Instead, it would only show 
that society is justified, on the basis of self-defence, 
in punishing physicians who refuse to breach 
confidence when demanded by law (6). But this 
should not shock us, since there is no guarantee that 
the demands of the law and those of morality will 
always be in harmony. This leads naturally to the 
next point. 
The second reason in support ofthis exception to 
the confidentiality rule begins with the observation 
that anyone who openly disobeys the law will be 
punished, either by fine or incarceration. Thus, to 
disobey the law is to incur a great sacrifice. But no 
one is required to make a great sacrifice. Such acts 
are called by philosophers 'supererogatory' or in 
more ordinary English, above and beyond the call of 
duty. Since agents are permitted to refrain from 
performing supererogatory acts, physicians are justi-
fied in breaching confidence when required by law; 
to deny this is to confuse acts that are required with 
those that are beyond the call of duty. 
This argument in defence of the exception is also 
flawed, however. It is based on the false assumption 
that morality never requires one to make great 
sacrifices. But counter-examples abound. Journalists 
plausibly regard themselves as required to endure 
incarceration rather than to reveal confidential 
sources. And parents are often obliged to undergo 
severe hardships for the welfare of their children. It is 
simply incorrect to assume that all self-sacrificial acts 
are supererogatory; some are morally required. And 
it is reasonable to expect that members of a helping 
profession, such as medicine, will be among those 
who are sometimes obligated to make such sacrifices. 
There may, of course, be other reasons to support 
the exception under discussion here. But even if 
there are no such reasons, it does not follow that 
physicians ought to disregard the law when it 
demands that they breach confidence. Instead, the 
conclusion to draw is that they should examine each 
law on its own merits. If the law is morally sound, 
they are justified in breaching confidence; if it is not 
morally sound, they must consider disobedience (7). 
Indeed, one might reasonably think that all citizens 
have a comparable responsibility. 
Those who endorse breaching confidence because 
it is required by law are probably impressed with the 
particular statutes with which they are acquainted, 
such as requirements to report gunshot wounds, 
infectious diseases, and evidence of child abuse. But 
if we ask what justifies each of these laws, a similar 
answer comes forth, one that appeals to a different 
clause in item four of the 'Fundamental Elements': 
each is arguably necessary to protect the public 
interest. A gunshot wound suggests likelihood of 
foul play and is evidence that the welfare of others 
may be endangered; thus, investigation is warranted. 
Similarly, steps must be taken to arrest infectious 
diseases in order to minimize harm and prevent 
epidemics. And when there is evidence of child 
abuse, there is reason to believe that the well-being 
of vulnerable minors is threatened and an immediate 
investigation is called for. These considerations are 
utilitarian and they arc impressive, especially in the 
case of reporting infectious diseases. 
An historical case 
Protecting the public interest is obviously a 
legitimate function of the law, and what I am sug-
gesting here is that our reason for approving of 
certain statutes requiring breach of confidence is 
that they promote this end, and not merely that 
they are duly enacted. To lend some credence to 
this hypothesis, consider these points. First, the 
hypothetical statute mentioned earlier requiring 
physicians to report all patients who test HIV-
positive so that this information can be disseminated 
to businesses is one of which most will likely 
disapprove, and surely it would do little to protect 
the public welfare. 
Second, consider an historical case. In 1966 
Richard Speck brutally murdered eight student 
nurses in Chicago, Illinois. Unbeknownst to Speck, 
one resident of the nurses' townhouse hid under a 
bed, thus saving her life. She provided the police 
with a description of the murderer, including the 
presence of a distinctive tattoo on his arm. Two days 
after the murders, Speck attempted suicide. He was 
taken to Cook County Hospital. A physician who 
treated him noticed the tattoo and called the police. 
Speck was arrested and later convicted of the 
murders. The physician revealed information about 
a patient that he had acquired in his role as a 
physician and he was not legally required to do so. 
Yet not only was this physician not criticized, he was 
widely praised. His action protected the welfare of 
the public. 
Third, when people debate the wisdom of 
legislation requiring breaches of confidence, often 
the debate is about whether the public interest is best 
served by such laws. Consider again the requirement 
to report evidence of child abuse. Some who oppose 
this argue that it will deter abusive parents from 
bringing their children for needed medical treatment 
(8). If the deterrence is great enough, innocent 
children will actually suffer more if we require that 
such evidence be reported than if there is no such 
requirement. Thus, the critics argue, the legislation 
is self-defeating. The point here, of course, is not to 
resolve this particular debate about reporting 
suspected child abusers. Rather, it is to call attention 
to the value that the disputants agree is at stake: the 
public interest. 
In response to the position that I have sketched 
here, some will object that it wrongly denies that 
each citizen has an obligation to obey duly enacted 
laws. But my argument need not deny this. The 
point instead is that physicians also have an 
obligation to keep information about their patients 
confidential. The obligations of confidentiality and 
obedience to the law can, in certain circumstances, 
conflict. Those who claim that physicians may 
breach patient confidentiality whenever required to 
do so by law are saying that the obligation to obey 
the law is always more important than, and takes 
precedence over, the obligation of confidentiality. 
But such a position is too simplistic. The strength of 
the general obligation to obey the law is context-
dependent and cannot be divorced from a particular 
statute's content. The obligation to obey a morally 
justifiable law is stronger than the obligation to obey 
a law that is unjustifiable, and the former are more 
likely to prevail in cases of conflict than are the latter. 
Some may also object that it is improper for 
physicians to attempt to judge what is or is not in the 
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public interest. But there is a response to this too. 
Surely when a statute directly affects the practice of 
medicine, health care practitioners are at least as 
competent to determine what is in the public interest 
as are legislators. A related objection is that 
physicians have been commissioned to care for the 
health of patients, not to safeguard the public 
interest (9). But this assumes either that physicians 
have no duty at all to protect the public interest, or 
that such a duty is always superseded by the duty 
owed to patients. Neither assumption is obviously 
true, however, and proponents of this objection owe 
us additional argumentation. 
We can agree with Veatch (in the previously 
quoted passage) that physicians 'must treat civil 
disobedience with appropriate seriousness'. Unfor-
tunately the first exception to the confidentiality rule 
endorsed in item four of the 'Fundamental 
Elements' goes much further than this. For a class of 
cases, it in effect counsels physicians to surrender to 
legislators their responsibility to make moral 
decisions. This is a mistake and this exception 
should be dropped. 
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